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ABSTRACT
On the heels of the popular March Madness National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”)
Basketball tournament, and following Northwestern University student-athletes’ success in
unionizing, the extent of student-athlete publicity rights is now more contentious than ever. The
divide between an ever-profiting NCAA and exploited NCAA student-athletes has sparked an
evolving class-action lawsuit by former student-athletes, who challenge the licensing of their images
and likenesses. This lawsuit has become a landmark test of the NCAA’s governance and notions
about amateurism in college athletics. The outcome of this case will be a possible sign that
compensation for both current and former student-athletes may be on the horizon. Regardless of the
current litigation’s outcome, both publicity rights standards and the NCAA’s governance are at
stake. In turn, a fair NCAA with a new set of regulations is likely to open up a whole new class of
legal representation for athletic agents and lawyers negotiating on student-athletes’ behalf.
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AN EVOLVING NCAA LEADING TO AN EXPANDING CLIENT LIST
FRANK BATTAGLIA*
I. INTRODUCTION
A distinguished non-profit organization describes itself as a “voluntary
association of more than 1,000 institutions, conferences and organizations.” 1 This
same non-profit organization states its basic purpose is “to maintain intercollegiate
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body.”2 In doing so, this organization “retain[s] a clear
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”3 This
non-profit organization is known as the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(“NCAA”)4 and is the same organization whose official licensing representative,
Collegiate Licensing Company (“CLC”), a for-profit entity, states there is a “$4.0
billion annual market for collegiate licensed merchandise.” 5
Despite this incredible market, student-athletes, under the guise of the NCAA,
are punished year-in and year-out for violating NCAA Bylaws that address the use of
one’s own likeness.6 Yet, the NCAA allegedly licenses these publicity rights, which
student-athletes sign away by way of waiver, to game makers and others. 7 Chris

* © Frank Battaglia. J.D. Candidate, May 2014, The John Marshall Law School. B.A. in
Political Science and Legal Studies, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois. As a former
wrestler at Northwestern University, and a proud brother to three other Division 1 student-athletes,
the collegiate student-athlete landscape and law surrounding it is a very passionate and personal
topic for me. I would like to thank The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law for its
assistance throughout the creation of this article.
1 Second Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 16, In re NCAA Student-Athlete
Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-01967 CW, 2011 WL 2185126 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2011)
[hereinafter Second Amended Complaint].
2 Id. ¶ 280.
3 NCAA, 2010-11 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL:
CONSTITUTION, OPERATING BYLAWS,
ADMINISTRATIVE BYLAWS § 1.3.1 (2010), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/D111.pdf [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
4 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 6 (addressing the aforementioned
descriptions of the NCAA).
5 Id. ¶ 16 (explaining that the CLC stated on their website there is a “$4.0 billion annual
market for collegiate licensed merchandise”).
6 Mark Yost, School for Scandals, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2010, at D5.
Reggie Bush was
punished for hiring a sports agent prior to declaring for the NFL draft. Bill Pennington, Bush,
Ineligible for ‘05, Returns His Heisman, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2010, at B15; Chris Dufresne, Reggie
Bush Gives Back the Heisman Trophy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2010, at C1. Next, twenty-eight Ohio
State University football players were punished for selling their own likenesses (mainly autographs,
memorabilia, and jerseys) in exchange for cash and tattoos. Tedd Greenstein, Cloud of Disgust;
Buckeyes Coach Steps Down Amid Ever-widening Charges of Serious NCAA Violations, CHI. TRIB.,
May 31, 2011, at C1.
7 See
Tom
Farrey,
“Student-Athlete”
Term
in
Question,
ESPN,
http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/8396753/ncaa-policy-chief-proposes-dropping-student-athleteterm (last updated Sept. 19, 2012) (stating Harvey Perlman, University of Nebraska chancellor,
wrote to Big 12 commissioner, Dan Beebe, stating “I’m still trying to figure out by what authority
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Plonsky, a proponent of current NCAA practices and longtime University of Texas
Administrator, claims athletes “voluntarily sign the release waiver” and refers to
their governance of student-athletes as a “version of the Army.” 8 He has also stated,
“[w]e have certain things we have to do a certain way to raise funds and pay for the
scholarships and other things [student-athletes] and their parents expect.”9 Those
allegations come from an administrator whose “army” raked in more than $150
million in 2010-11.10
This divide amongst an ever profiting NCAA and partnered organizations has
sparked an emerging class-action lawsuit by current and former student-athletes
who challenge the NCAA’s licensing of their images and likeness. 11 Spearheading
this lawsuit is former University of California at Los Angeles (“UCLA”) basketball
star, Edward O’Bannon, who helped the 1994–95 Bruins win the coveted NCAA
Division I national title.12 After college he went on to play in the NBA for several
years,13 but now is a car salesman in Nevada.14 In 2009, O’Bannon individually filed
suit against the NCAA, EA, and the CLC.15 Since then, other former studentathletes have joined the suit that is now labeled In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litigation.16 This class action suit against the NCAA, EA Sports,
and the CLC claims they engaged in anti-competitive practices in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act17 and that they violated student athletes’ publicity rights.18
This Comment will analyze the student-athletes’ publicity rights and antitrust
claims in the context of the current class action dispute against the NCAA, CLC, and
EA. Part I of this Comment provides background information on the NCAA Manual
the NCAA licenses these rights to the game makers and others. I looked at what our student
athletes sign by way of waiver and it doesn’t come close.”).
8 See Farrey, supra note 7.
9 See id.
10 See Steve Wieberg, Jodi Upton, & Steve Berkowitz, Texas Athletics Overwhelm Rivals in
Revenue
and
Spending,
USA
TODAY
(May
15,
2012),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/story/2012-05-15/texas-athletics-spendingrevenue/54960210/1 (“The Longhorns took in a little more than $150 million in 2010–11, the most
recent year for which public schools’ filings with the NCAA are available.”).
11 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 6–7; see also Farrey, supra note 7 (“[T]he
philosophical divide emerges in depositions and frank emails unsealed this week in a class-action
lawsuit by former UCLA basketball star Ed O’Bannon and other players who challenge the NCAA’s
licensing of their images to video games manufacturers and other third parties.”).
12 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 45 (stating that “[i]n the 1994–95 season, Mr.
O’Bannon led his team to a national championship, and scored 30 points and had 17 rebounds in the
championship game.”).
13 See
Ed
O’Bannon,
BASKETBALL-REFERENCE.COM,
http://www.basketballreference.com/players/o/obbanned01.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012) (showing that O’Bannon played
four seasons in the NBA).
14 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 45.
15 See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Nos. C 09-1967 CW, C 09-3329 CW, C 094882 CW, 2010 WL 445190, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010).
16 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 8 (stating antitrust plaintiffs were Ed
O’Bannon, Harry Flournoy, Alex Gilbert, Sam Jacobson, Thad Jaracz, David Lattin, Patrick
Maynor, Tyrone Prothro, Damien Rhodes, Eric Riley, Bob Tallent, and Danny Wimprine). The
publicity rights plaintiffs include Samuel Keller, Bryan Cummings, Lamarr Watkins, and Byron
Bishop. Id. ¶¶ 40–43.
17 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
18 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 46–47.
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and Bylaws. This discussion focuses on the contract that student-athletes enter into
with the NCAA, as well as the current antitrust and right of publicity arguments
that current and former student-athletes are making in litigation against the NCAA.
Part II analyzes potential arguments for and against current NCAA practice,
including discussing the suggested revisions from proponents of student-athlete
compensation. Part III proposes possible implications to student-athletes and the
NCAA, and a possible emerging legal field of representation.
II. BACKGROUND
The current controversy between the NCAA and student-athletes revolves
around the NCAA Manual and Bylaws, possible implications under antitrust law,
and the student-athletes’ publicity rights. Accordingly, this section focuses on the
different parties involved in the suit, the contract student-athletes enter into with
the NCAA, as well as the current arguments student-athletes are making in
litigation against the NCAA.
A. Relationship Between the NCAA, CLC, and EA Sports
As previously stated, the NCAA’s main purpose is to govern “intercollegiate
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an
integral part of the student body.”19 In doing so, this organization “retain[s] a clear
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”20
The CLC “represents nearly 200 of the nation’s top colleges, universities, bowl
games, athletic conferences, the Heisman Trophy, and the NCAA.” 21 This trademark
licensing company has been the “leader in connecting passionate college fans to their
favorite college brands for more than three decades.” 22 Since the CLC formed, they
have “paid its collegiate partners more than $1 billion in royalties.”23 In 2005, CLC
entered in an exclusive contract with EA Sports, granting them the exclusive right to
develop and distribute interactive NCAA football and basketball video games. 24
EA Sports, headquartered in California, is one of the world’s leading developers
and publishers of videogames.25 The exclusive contract entered into with the CLC
granted EA Sports the exclusive rights to the “teams, stadiums and schools for use in
its best-selling college football videogames.”26 The relationship between the NCAA,

Supra note 3, § 1.3.1.
Id.
21 About CLC, COLLEGIATE LICENSING COMPANY, http://www.clc.com/About-CLC.aspx (last
visited Jan. 26, 2014).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 CLC Grants EA Exclusive College Football Videogame License, BUSINESSWIRE (Apr. 11,
2005, 8:30 A.M.), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20050411005378/en/CLC-Grants-EAExclusive-College-Football-Videogame#.UuL2dxDnbIU.
25 Id.
26 Id.
19
20
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its partnered licensing company, CLC, and EA Sports has generated incredible
revenue since its inception.
B. Student-Athlete Contract
Freshmen—mostly teenage—student-athletes enter their respective universities
and are bombarded within the first weeks of school with numerous speeches,
meetings, and documents that require their signatures. Having experienced this
firsthand, this can be an overwhelming series of events. One of the documents
student-athletes are faced with is the “Student-Athlete Statement” (“Form 08-3a”).
Student-athletes’ eligibility is contingent upon the signing of Form 08-3a,27
specifications for content and administration of which are set forth in the Bylaws. 28
This is important, because a contractual release can waive an individual’s publicity
right.29 Essentially, student-athletes sign Form 08-3a to establish eligibility, but
relinquish their publicity rights in the process. 30 Determining whether Form 08-3a is
a valid contract has become the forefront issue in recent litigation brought forth by
former student-athletes.31
C. NCAA Division I Manual
As the Supreme Court noted in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of
Oklahoma (“Board of Regents”), the NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of
a revered amateurism tradition in college sports. 32 This principle is reflected
throughout the NCAA Division I Manual. 33 The Bylaws cited in this manual govern
student-athletes and their respective institutions. 34 Furthermore, the Bylaws set
forth numerous instances where student-athletes may lose amateur status. 35 In
particular, student-athletes are prohibited from accepting pay, or the promise of pay,
based on their sports.36 Example forms of pay include, but are not limited to, salary,

27 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, § 14.1.3.1 (stating that “[f]ailure to complete and sign the
statement shall result in the student-athlete’s ineligibility for participation in all intercollegiate
competition.”).
28 Id. § 14.1.3.2.
29 See Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 453–54 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the plaintiff’s
release of all claims against the defendant barred the plaintiff’s claims for publicity right licensing
revenues and copyright violations).
30 NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, § 14.1.3.2; Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 296.
31 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 296.
32 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984).
33 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, § 1.3.1 (explaining that the basic purpose of the NCAA is
to “retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”); see
also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 12.1.2.1 to § 12.1.2.3 (discussing amateur status and the
“prohibited” forms of pay).
34 Id. § 1.3.2 (stating “[m]ember institutions shall be obligated to apply and enforce this
legislation, and the enforcement procedures of the Association shall be applied to an institution
when it fails to fulfill this obligation.”).
35 Id. §§ 12.1.2.1 to 12.1.2.3.
36 Id. § 12.1.2.
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benefits, or preferential treatment.37 Student-athletes are prohibited from using
their names, likenesses, or pictures to promote a business.38 Additionally, if studentathletes have knowledge of such unpermitted usages, they must take steps to cease
this usage.39 A failure to do so results in a loss of eligibility.40
Moreover, student-athletes are prohibited from using agents to market their
athletic ability.41 This includes the presence of a lawyer at negotiations 42 or using an
agent in placing the prospective student-athlete in a collegiate institution.43
D. Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation
Former student-athletes have made the argument that these Bylaws place
significant economic burdens on student-athletes even after their tenures as
collegiate athletes end.44 Accordingly, former student-athletes filed a pivotal classaction suit in the Northern District of California against the NCAA. 45
This suit consists of two distinguished classes: the antitrust class and the
publicity rights class.46 The antitrust class claims that the NCAA forces studentathletes to sign away their likenesses, by conspiring with EA and the CLC to prevent
compensation for their images, which ultimately violates antitrust law. 47 The
publicity rights class claims that the NCAA unlawfully uses student-athletes’ images
and likenesses by refusing to compensate the student-athletes even after
graduation.48

37 See id. § 12.1.2.1. The various forms of pay include, but are not limited to: salary; gratuity
or compensation; educational expenses; division or split of surplus; expenses, awards and benefits;
cash; payment based on performance, preferential treatment, benefits or services; prize for
participation. Id.
38 Id. § 12.5.2.
39 See id. § 12.5.2.2 (“Such steps are not required in cases in which a student-athlete’s
photograph is sold by an individual or agency (e.g., private photographer, news agency) for private
use.”).
40 Id. § 12.5.2.1.
41 Id. § 12.3.1 (“An individual shall be ineligible for participation in an intercollegiate sport if
he or she ever has agreed (orally or in writing) to be represented by an agent for the purpose of
marketing his or her athletics ability or reputation in that sport.”).
42 Id. § 12.3.2.1.
43 Id. § 12.3.3.
44 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 45.
45 Id. ¶ 6.
46 Id. ¶ 2 (indicating the court’s preference that the complaint has discrete sections for the
right of publicity claims and the antitrust claims).
47 See id. ¶ 9 (explaining that the antitrust plaintiffs allege that the NCAA, EA, and the CLC
have engaged in a price-fixing conspiracy and a group boycott because they refuse to deal with the
plaintiffs in the commercial exploitation of their images). The plaintiffs also contend that the
defendants have conspired to deprive the plaintiffs “from receiving compensation in connection with
the use of their names, images, and likenesses in EA’s various NCAA video game products.” Id.
¶ 10.
48 See id. ¶ 296 (explaining that at a hearing on Dec. 17, 2009, upon questioning from the
Court, the NCAA counsel confirmed that the NCAA’s rights to the athlete’s likeness continues even
after they graduate).
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1. Antitrust Class
The antitrust plaintiffs allege that the NCAA, EA, and the CLC have continued
to use their images after their collegiate careers end.49 In doing so, the plaintiffs
allege the NCAA, EA, and CLC have committed antitrust law violations pursuant to
the Sherman Antitrust Act.50
In regards to antitrust law and amateurism, legal precedent has consistently
ruled in the NCAA’s favor.51 In 1984, in Board of Regents, the Supreme Court stated
that the NCAA should be given authority in safeguarding the character and quality
of its product.52 The Court reiterated that the NCAA has authority to enforce its
historic role in the preservation and encouragement of amateur athletics. 53 The
Court reasoned that since the NCAA’s inception in 1905, it has adopted and enforced
“playing rules, standards of amateurism, standards for academic eligibility,
regulations concerning recruitment of athletes, and rules governing the size of
athletic squads and coaching staffs.”54 With these goals in mind, the Court held that
the NCAA’s practices are “entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.” 55
Although precedent seems to rule in the NCAA’s favor, the case-at-hand
presents a viable claim: whether the NCAA’s goal of maintaining amateurism
applies to former student-athletes.56 The former student-athlete plaintiffs contend it
does not.57

Id. ¶ 9.
See id. ¶ 26 (“The NCAA’s abridgement of former student-athletes’ economic rights in
perpetuity is unconnected to any continuing pro-educational benefits for former student-athletes,
who by definition are no longer student athletes. Defendants’ patently anticompetitive illegal
scheme has unreasonably restrained trade, and is a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”); 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal.”).
51 See Gaines v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744–45 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
In this case, a former college NCAA football player entered the NFL draft, was not selected, and
then attempted to return to the NCAA and was denied eligibility. Id. at 740. The Court ruled in
favor of the NCAA, stating that the NCAA’s eligibility rules were not subject to the antitrust
analysis and were not a violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at 744–45. In another case, a studentathlete alleged the NCAA violated the Sherman Act by capping the number of scholarships given
per team and prohibiting multi-year scholarships. Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683
F.3d 328, 332–33 (7th Cir. 2012). The court held that this did not have an anticompetitive effect on
the market for student-athletes. Id. at 343. Here, the Seventh Circuit recognized the NCAA has a
strong interest in protecting the amateur objectives of NCAA college football by enforcing eligibility
rules. Id.
52 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101–02
(1984).
53 See id. at 88 (“[S]ince its inception in 1905, the NCAA has played an important role in the
regulation of amateur collegiate sports.”). The court reasoned that the NCAA plays a vital role in
maintaining a tradition of amateurism in collegiate sports. Id. at 120. The Court stated “[t]here can
be no question but that [the NCAA] needs ample latitude to play that role, or that the preservation
of the student-athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics
and is entirely consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.” Id.
54 Id. at 88.
55 Id. at 120.
56 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 17–19.
57 Id.
49
50
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In determining whether there is a Sherman Antitrust violation, courts have
adopted the per se analysis and rule of reason doctrine.58 The per se analysis is
applied when “there are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively
presumed to be unreasonable . . . .”59 That is to be compared with the rule of reason
analysis, which requires a consideration of the nature, purpose, and competitive
effect of any challenged agreement before a decision on its legality is made. 60 As
discussed below, modern antitrust precedence has consistently analyzed the NCAA’s
governance under the rule of reason analysis.
In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court applied the rule of reason test because
“th[e] case involve[d] an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are
essential if the product is to be available at all.” 61 This decision solidified the
Supreme Court’s adequate acceptance of the competitive balance argument, which
suggests justification for this case to be analyzed under the rule of reason.62
Accordingly, the rule of reason is the appropriate test to apply in this situation.
Under the rule of reason test, courts will go through a three-step process that
involves shifting the burden of proof from one party to the other. First, the claimant
must show that (1) the restraint has had substantial, adverse anti-competitive
effects; the defendant then (2) must show that the conduct promotes a sufficiently
pro-competitive objective; and, in rebuttal, the claimant must demonstrate that (3)
the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objective.63
A restraint has a substantial, adverse anti-competitive effect when: (1) the
defendants contracted or conspired among each other; (2) this led to anti-competitive
effects within the relevant product markets; (3) the objects of that contract or
conspiracy were illegal; and (4) “the plaintiffs were injured as a proximate result.”64
Next, the second and third factors respectively require the defendant to rebut
with a sufficiently pro-competitive objective and for the plaintiff to establish facts
demonstrating these restraints are not reasonably necessary to achieve that stated
objective.65 The true test of legality under these factors is whether the restraint
imposed is such that it merely regulates, and perhaps thereby promotes, competition
or whether it is such that it may suppress or even destroy competition. 66
The antitrust plaintiffs argue that the NCAA, EA, and the CLC have continually
used their images after their collegiate careers end, which results in antitrust
violations.67 First, the athletes argue that the NCAA, CLC, and EA have agreed and
58 See FEDERAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS § 40 (2013). The rule of reason is not necessarily a rule,
it is more of a concept that can adapt over time. Id. This Section explains that “it is based on and
thus confined by the purpose of the Sherman Anti-trust Act itself.” Id.
59 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
60 Chi. Bd. of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
61 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984).
62 Id. at 119.
63 Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997); Pocono Invitational
Sports Camp, Inc. v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 317 F. Supp. 2d 569, 580 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
64 Tunis Bros. Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Martin B.
Glauser Dodge Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72, 81 (3d Cir. 1977).
65 Chi. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238.
66 Tibor Nagy, The “Blind Look” Rule of Reason: Federal Courts’ Peculiar Treatment of NCAA
Amateurism Rules, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 331, 338 (2005).
67 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 9.
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conspired to permit the use of player names and likenesses. 68 In doing so, the
student-athletes make a convincing argument that Form 08-3a enforcement is
unconscionable, making it an illegal contract.69 The student-athletes argue that
Form 08-3a is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.70 They argue
that it is procedurally unconscionable because it is an adhesion contract,71 and
because NCAA rules prohibit student-athletes from hiring agents or attorneys to
negotiate these contracts on their behalf.72 The student-athletes argue that Form 083a is substantively unconscionable because the detriment to the student-athletes
outweighs the benefits.73 More specifically, the athletes target the unfavorable
language in Form 08-3a that releases their publicity rights to the NCAA in
perpetuity.74
In response, the NCAA must show that it created a sufficiently pro-competitive
objective.75 The NCAA would argue that precedent supports its purpose of promoting
amateurism and therefore it does not violate the Sherman Act. 76 However, the
plaintiffs rebut that the regulations promulgated by the NCAA to protect
amateurism are not applicable and do not apply to former student-athletes.77
Last, the student-athletes must establish facts demonstrating the NCAA’s
restraints are not reasonably necessary to achieve its amateurism objective.78 While
current and former student-athletes make up the present plaintiff class, case law
that has consistently ruled in the NCAA’s favor addressed current student-athletes.79

Id. ¶ 228.
Id. ¶¶ 23, 402.
70 Id. at ¶ 23.
71 See Am. Bankers Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1412 (9th Cir.
1996) (“California law defines a contract of adhesion as ‘. . . a standardized contract, which, imposed
and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the
opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.’”) (citing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal.3d
807, 817 (1981)).
72 See NCAA Manual, supra note 3, § 12.2.1; see also Dan Fitzgerald, Oliver v. NCAA: Court
Throws Out NCAA Baseball Lawyer-Agent Rule, CONNECTICUT SPORTS LAW (Feb. 25, 2009)
http://ctsportslaw.com/2009/02/25/oliver-v-ncaa-court-throws-out-ncaa-baseball-lawyer-agent-rule/.
73 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 304.
74 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 300. The complaint alleges:
68
69

The NCAA, through its total control of intercollegiate athletics, and due to a gross
disparity in bargaining power, requires student-athletes sign nonnegotiable forms, as the
terms are nonnegotiable. Any Class member declining to do so is barred by the NCAA
and the relevant member institution from all further intercollegiate athletic competition.
Id.

Id. ¶ 17.
Id. ¶¶ 28–29; Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
88 (1984).
77 Id. ¶ 30.
78 Id.
79 See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 135–36 (upholding the notion of the NCAA as the defender of
amateurism in collegiate sports); see also Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp. 850,
862–63 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (denying a motion regarding enforcement of the NCAA’s “no draft” rule
when a player who entered the NFL draft, went undrafted, and was denied a return to college
football); McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
that restrictions on athlete compensation were not price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act).
75
76
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Accordingly, the plaintiffs argue that this precedent does not apply to former
student-athletes who are being harmed.80
2. Right of Publicity Class
In continuing to use the student-athletes’ images, a class also claims violation of
the right of publicity. The “right of publicity” is a recent development in the law,
having only been coined in 1953.81 This signified the emergence of a property right in
a person’s identity.82 Since then, through judicial precedent and the enactment of
state statutes, one has a publicity right in one’s physical likeness, voice, and name or
nickname.83 One infringes upon this right through the “unpermitted use of a
person’s identity in a commercial setting.”84 The right of publicity has increasingly
expanded over the past fifty years.85 Accordingly, as of 2012, thirty-one states have
established either a common law or statutory publicity right. 86
In this suit, the NCAA, CLC, and EA are subject to California and Indiana law.87
California and Indiana are two of the nineteen states that recognize a statutory right
of publicity.88 Typically, courts use the transformative test to determine whether
one’s publicity right is violated.89

Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 26.
See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1.26 (2d ed. 2012)
[hereinafter MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY] (“Judge Jerome Frank in 1953 was the first to coin the term
‘right of publicity.’ He used it to denote a property right in a person’s identity.”).
82 Id.
83 See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825–26 (9th Cir. 1974)
(holding that courts would afford legal protection to an individual’s proprietary interest in his own
physical interest and likeness); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
“that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in
order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs”); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 414 (9th Cir. 1996) (the Court held that “name or likeness” is not limited
to present or current use of one’s name, and that the use of one’s name, which adequately reflects
that same person, and used to gain a commercial advantage, is an infringement of one’s publicity
right).
84 See MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY, supra note 81, § 1:26.
85 See, e.g., Matea Gold, Schwarzenegger Isn’t Buying It, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2003),
http://articles.latimes.com/2003/jan/22/local/me-arnold22 (“[F]or actor Arnold Schwarzenegger, the
unauthorized use of his picture in a newspaper ad for an Ohio car dealership was serious enough to
warrant a multimillion-dollar lawsuit.”).
86 See MCCARTHY, PUBLICITY, supra note 81, § 6:3 (stating that as of March 2012, “courts have
expressly recognized the right of publicity as existing under the common law of 21 states”).
According to McCarthy, “eight [states] also have statutory provisions broad enough to encompass
the right of publicity” and “ten states have statutes which, while some are labeled ‘privacy’ statutes,
are worded in such a way that most aspects of the right of publicity are embodied in those statutes.”
Id.
87 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 260.
The EA has its headquarters in
California, subjecting them to California law, and the CLC executives who negotiated the contracts
with EA were located in California. Id. ¶¶ 257, 259. License negotiations between the NCAA and
CLC have required frequent contact in Indiana by EA. Id. ¶ 257. Moreover, “[t]he NCAA has its
principal place of business in Indiana and is therefore an Indiana resident and citizen.” Id. ¶ 258.
88 See Statutes, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, http://rightofpublicity.com/statutes (last visited Jan. 26,
2014). The right of publicity is currently recognized by statute in California, Florida, Illinois,
80
81
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The transformative test determines whether the expression possessing the
individual’s likeness is transformative enough to qualify for First Amendment
protection.90 The growing tension between the student-athletes and the NCAA is
exemplified by a growing expansion of what constitutes a protected publicity right
under this test. A combination of evolving media technology, collegiate athletes’
personas becoming increasingly popular, and an expanding publicity rights class give
rise to this claim.
In establishing a right of publicity claim, the student-athletes must show: “(1)
the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff’s name
or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent;
and (4) resulting injury.”91
In the past, the Ninth Circuit ruled in the claimant’s favor where the claimant’s
publicity right had a distinctive and recognizable nature that resulted in a
commercial value, and could be affixed to the claimant’s identity. 92 The Court also
held that when the individual aspects of publicity examined are not sufficient for a
statutory publicity rights cause of action, but viewed in totality, give rise to a
common law publicity rights claim, the claimant has a sufficient cause of action. 93
As a result of increased popularity in college sports, collegiate athletes’ personas
have become increasingly popular. Increased interest in collegiate athletics has led
to increased demand for sports merchandise, 94 an evolving technology that has
created more marketing channels,95 and increased video game popularity. 96 This
growing value of student-athletes’ publicity rights, which are signed away to the
NCAA, creates a greater case for unfairness.
Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id.
89 Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808–10 (Cal. 2001).
90 Drew Sherman, The Right of Publicity and the First Amendment Defense in California, 9
INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 29, 32 (2004); see also Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 810 (applying the
traditional copyright concept of tranformativeness to a right of publicity case).
91 Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 803 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Eastwood v.
Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417 (1983)).
92 See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974). In this
case, a race car driver sued a tobacco company for using an altered photo of his racecar in a cigarette
advertisement. Id. at 822. The Court held in the race car driver’s favor, stating that the car had a
distinctive and recognizable nature, resulting in commercial value that could be affixed to the
plaintiffs’ identity. Id. at 827.
93 See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). In this case,
Vanna White, the famous hostess for the game show “Wheel of Fortune,” brought suit against
Samsung. Id. at 1396. White alleged that Samsung aired an advertisement featuring a female
robot that performed very similar acts to those that she performed on “Wheel of Fortune.” Id. The
Court held that individual aspects of the advertisement were not sufficient for a statutory publicity
rights cause of action, but viewed all together, there was little doubt that Samsung wrongfully
replicated White. Id. at 1399.
94 PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, PROBLEMS 769
(2d ed. 1998). The collegiate sports merchandise market has grown from less than $100 million in
the early 1980s to an estimated $4.3 billion in 2009. Id.
95 See, e.g., Watch ESPN, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/watchespn/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2014);
NCAA Live, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.com/liveschedule (last visited Mar. 8, 2014); Big Ten Digital
Network, BTN.COM, http://video.btn.com/allaccess/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
96 Anastasios Kaburakis et al., NCAA Student-Athletes’ Rights of Publicity, EA Sports, and the
Video Game Industry, 27-SUM ENT. & SPORTS LAW. 1, 14 (2009).
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The student-athlete plaintiffs argue that the NCAA does not officially allow for
the licensing of student-athlete likenesses.97 More specifically, the plaintiffs claim
that NCAA Bylaw 12.5 “prohibits the commercial licensing of an NCAA athlete’s
‘name, picture or likeness.’”98 In order to enforce this rule, all incoming freshman
and transfer student-athletes are required to enter Form 08-3a to maintain
eligibility.99 This same contract, Form 08-3a, prohibits the NCAA from using these
athlete’s likenesses for commercial purposes.100 However, the plaintiffs allege that
the NCAA “sanctions, facilitates and profits from EA’s use of student-athletes’
names, pictures, and likenesses despite contractual obligations prohibiting such
conduct.”101
The plaintiffs allege that EA, with the knowledge, participation, and approval of
the NCAA and CLC, extensively utilizes actual student-athletes’ names and
likenesses for greater profit.102 The plaintiffs point to evident similarities between
actual student-athletes and characters in the video games. 103 This class alleges that
EA, the NCAA, and the CLC violate student-athletes’ common law right of
publicity,104 Indiana’s right of publicity statute,105 and California’s right of publicity
statute.106
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation has become a
“landmark test of the NCAA’s governance and notions about college athletes.” 107 On
November 8th, 2013, Northern District of California Judge Claudia Wilken, issued
her order on the plaintiff’s class certification. 108 The decision allowed the players to
certify their class, but it significantly reduced the scope of the class. 109 While the
plaintiffs were certified to pursue an injunction barring the NCAA from prohibiting
current and former student-athletes from pursuing licensing deals for the uses of
their names, images, and likenesses, Judge Wilken denied the plaintiffs’ attempt for
certification to seek monetary damages. 110 This ruling means that players cannot
sue as a class over past and current NCAA profits arising from television broadcasts,
video games, and other products. However, these individual student-athletes can file
complaints detailing the player’s history as an NCAA student-athlete and a specific
Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 181.
Id.
99 Id. ¶ 182.
100 See id. ¶ 183 (alleging that Form 08-3a is contradictory to NCAA Bylaw 12.5, which
specifically prohibits the commercial licensing of NCAA athletes’ name, picture or likeness).
101 Id. ¶ 184.
102 See id. ¶ 180. EA is not permitted to use the player likenesses.
Id. According to the
complaint, “however, EA with the knowledge, participation and approval of the NCAA and CLC
extensively utilizes actual player names and likenesses.” Id. This allows EA users to identify
college athletes playing the game. Id. The alleged motivation for the NCAA here is “more money”
because “heightened realism in NCAA videogames translates directly into . . . increased revenues for
Electronic Arts and increased royalties for CLC and the NCAA.” Id.
103 Id. ¶¶ 200–26.
104 Id. ¶¶ 261–67; Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
105 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 261–67; IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1 (2009).
106 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 261–67; CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (2009).
107 Farrey, supra note 7.
108 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., C 09-1967 CW, 2013 WL
5979327, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2013).
109 Id. at *9, 10.
110 Id. at *10.
97
98
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accounting of how they were harmed by the NCAA.111 This suit will move forward
nonetheless and the NCAA model, along with the conferences receiving hundreds of
millions of dollars in television rights, is still at risk.
The case is scheduled to go on trial in June 2014 and the outcome of this case is
a possible sign that compensation for both current and former student-athletes may
be on the horizon.112 Regardless, after many failed attempts the student-athletes’
hopes to break into this colossal market seems more viable now than ever.
III. ANALYSIS
While the antitrust and publicity rights classes have different claims, their
allegations revolve around the same issue: whether student-athletes consent to the
NCAA’s continual use of their publicity rights. 113 The student-athletes contend that
Form 08-3a is an unconscionable adhesion contract that is unenforceable and an
antitrust violation.114 Additionally, the student-athletes argue that the NCAA’s
continual use of their names and likenesses is a publicity rights violation.115
A. Antitrust and Contract Unenforceability Analysis
The former student-athletes argue that Form 08-3a is an adhesion contract that
is procedurally and substantively unconscionable, making it an illegal and
unenforceable contract. Additionally, their antitrust argument is strengthened if
Form 08-3a is found unenforceable.116
As previously stated, the Supreme Court has created a very high standard for
student-athletes who bring antitrust claims against the NCAA. 117 This is based on
the NCAA’s critical role in maintaining the amateurism tradition in collegiate
sports.118 But contrary to the existing case law, the current plaintiffs argue that the
NCAA’s marketing of student-athletes’ images and likenesses in perpetuity is an
antitrust violation.119 To prove a Sherman Act violation, the student-athletes must
show that the NCAA’s practice is an unreasonable trade restraint. 120
Id. at *7.
Michael McCann, O’Bannon Expands NCAA Lawsuit, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 1, 2012,
11:11
A.M.)
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/writers/michael_mccann/09/01/obannon-ncaalawsuit [hereinafter McCann, O’Bannon Expands Lawsuit]. The author explained that this suit
seeks to expand the class action to include current D-1 football and men’s basketball players. Id.
The plaintiffs seek a temporary trust set up for monies generated by the licensing of their names,
likeness, and images. Id. These trusts would be acceptable at the completion of their collegiate
career. Id. This argument can have many consequences that will be discussed infra.
113 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 7, 25.
114 See id. ¶ 302.
115 See id. ¶ 25.
116 See id. ¶¶ 24–25.
117 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984).
118 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, §§ 1.3.1, 12.1.2.1 to 12.1.2.3 (discussing amateur status
and the “prohibited” forms of pay).
119 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 9.
120 See id. ¶ 449.
111
112
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1. Rule of Reason and Unconscionability
As previously discussed in the background, to prove the NCAA’s practice is an
unreasonable trade restraint, under the rule of reason test: (1) the student-athletes
must show that the restraint has had substantial, adverse anti-competitive effects;
(2) the defendant must show that the conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive
objective; and (3) the student-athletes must show that the restraint is not reasonably
necessary to achieve the stated objective. 121
2. Substantial, Adverse Anti-Competitive Effect
First, the athletes argue that the NCAA, CLC, and EA have agreed and
conspired to permit the use of player names and likenesses. 122 The student-athletes
make a strong argument that Form 08-3a enforcement is unconscionable, making it
an unenforceable contract, which strengthens the antitrust argument. 123
To
establish unconscionability, the student-athletes must show that Form 08-3a is both
procedurally124 and substantively unconscionable.125
A contract is procedurally unconscionable when one party is unfairly surprised
by the terms in the contract, or has no meaningful choice but to sign. 126 The studentathletes argue that Form 08-3a is procedurally unconscionable because it is an
adhesion contract127 enforced annually by the NCAA on young student-athletes,
whose signing is mandatory to maintain eligibility. 128 They argue these athletes are
young, inexperienced and cannot fully comprehend the Form 08-3a terms.129 These
incoming student-athletes, most teenagers, are presented with vast legal documents

Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997).
See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 228.
123 See id. ¶¶ 302, 448–49.
124 See Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating procedural
unconscionability “is manifested by (1) ‘oppression,’ which refers to an inequality of bargaining
power resulting in no meaningful choice for the weaker party, or (2) ‘surprise,’ which occurs when
the supposedly agreed-upon terms are hidden in a document.”) (citing A & M Produce Co. v. FMC
Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)).
125 See 8 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:9 (4th ed. 2013) (“Perhaps most courts today consider
two aspects as central to determining whether a contract or clause is unconscionable: The “absence
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.”) (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350
F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir 1965)).
126 Navellier, 262 F.3d at 940.
127 See Am. Bankers Mortg. Corp. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 75 F.3d 1401, 1412 (9th
Cir. 1996) (“California law defines a contract of adhesion as ‘. . . a standardized contract, which,
imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party
only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.’”) (citing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28
Cal.3d 807, 817 (1981)).
128 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 23.
129 See Michael McCann, NCAA Faces Unspecified Damages, Changes in Latest Anti-Trust
Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 21, 2009), http://athleterightsguide.com/ncaa-faces-unspecifieddamages-changes-in-latest-anti-trust-case/ (claiming that a lack of life experience of most seventeenyear-old incoming student-athletes makes the process exploitive); See McCann, O’Bannon Expands
Lawsuit, supra note 112.
121
122
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and forms.130 Universities require these teenage student-athletes to sign these
documents to maintain eligibility, ultimately leaving incoming student-athletes with
no meaningful choice.131
Moreover, NCAA rules prohibit student-athletes from hiring agents or attorneys
to negotiate these contracts on their behalf.132 Additionally, student-athletes’
eligibility and scholarships are contingent upon signing Form 08-3a.133 This leaves
them with no meaningful choice but to sign Form 08-3a or lose eligibility.134
The NCAA would argue that the Student-Athlete Statement is seven pages long
and requires individual signatures for each separate clause. 135 Moreover, studentathletes are required on an annual basis to meet with compliance staff to clarify
these regulations.136 The NCAA argues that they are presenting an opportunity to
these student-athletes, an opportunity that is not recognized as a legal right. 137
Although the student-athletes may have a strong argument for procedural
unconscionability, they must also show Form 08-3a is substantively unconscionable.
In determining whether there is substantive unconscionability, the court will look to
Form 08-3a’s terms and weigh the benefits and detriments incurred by studentathletes.138
The student-athletes argue that Form 08-3a is substantively
unconscionable because the detriment to the student-athletes outweighs the
benefits.139 More specifically, the NCAA’s incredible merchandise revenue and
television contracts outweigh possible student-athlete scholarship benefits.140
The athletes will point to the unfavorable language in Form 08-3a that releases
their publicity rights to the NCAA in perpetuity. 141 In signing Form 08-3a, it may
have been foreseeable that the student-athletes were giving up their publicity rights
for the academic year;142 however, it was not reasonably foreseeable that the NCAA
obtained these publicity rights for eternity. 143 When student-athletes sign Form 083a, they do so with an understanding that they have athletic and academic

130 NLI
Provisions, NAT’L LETTER INTENT, http://www.nationalletter.org/nliProvisions/
index.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2014); NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, § 14.1.3 (“To be eligible to
represent an institution in intercollegiate athletics competition, a student-athlete shall be in
compliance with all applicable provisions of the constitution and bylaws of the Association.”).
131 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
132 See NCAA Manual, supra note 3, § 12.2.1; see also Fitzgerald, supra note 72.
133 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 187.
134 Id.
135 See id. ¶ 187 (“The contract has seven parts, all of which must be executed by the student to
receive certification that he is eligible to participate in NCAA Division I sporting events.”).
136 See Form 13-3a, Student-Athlete Statement—NCAA Division I, NCAA 7 (2013), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/2013-14-division-i-compliance-forms (“Any questions regarding this form should
be referred to your director of athletics or your institution’s NCAA compliance staff, or you may
contact the NCAA at [phone number].”).
137 Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 659 (Cal. 1994) (stating there is “no
legal right to participate in intercollegiate athletic competition”).
138 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 301–04.
139 Id.
140 Robertson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. CV 11-0388, 2001 WL 240797, at *25 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 26, 2011).
141 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 300.
142 See id. ¶ 285.
143 Id. ¶ 296.
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obligations to perform in living up to their scholarships.144 However, once their
tenures as student-athletes end, one would think that their own likenesses leave the
university with them.145
The plaintiffs argue they do not receive compensation from NCAA products that
continue to generate profits using student-athletes’ likenesses.146 Student-athletes
argue that the NCAA returns profit from video footage, memorabilia, commercials,
and DVD sales, all of which use student-athletes’ likenesses.147 If the former
student-athletes can prove that Form 08-3a is both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable, it is likely that Form 08-3a will be found void.
If Form 08-3a is found void and unenforceable, the NCAA is using illegal means
to further anti-competitive effects on student-athletes.148 As for damages, the
student-athletes have been denied compensation after their college careers for the
continual use of their publicity rights. 149
3. Conduct Promotes a Sufficiently Competitive Objective
Second, the NCAA must show that it created a sufficiently pro-competitive
objective.150 The NCAA would argue that precedent supports its contention—that its
purpose is to promote amateurism—and that it does not violate the Sherman Act.
The Supreme Court has held that the NCAA regulations will generally lead to
reasonable trade restraints.151 In McCormack v. NCAA, the Fifth Circuit noted that
the “NCAA markets college football as a product distinct from professional football.
The eligibility rules create the product and allow its survival in the face of
commercializing pressures. The goal of the NCAA is to integrate athletics with
academics. Its requirements reasonably further this goal.” 152 Summarily, the procompetitive nature of these regulations outweighs the anticompetitive effects. 153
Next, the student-athletes must rebut the NCAA’s argument of pro-competitive
effects.

144 See Brian Davidson, End of NCAA As We Know It?, NCSA ATHLETIC RECRUITING (July 22,
2009), http://www.ncsasports.org/blog/2009/07/22/end-of-ncaa-as-we-know-it/ (O’Bannon stated,
“When you’re in school you’re obligated to live up to your scholarship . . . [b]ut once you’re done, you
physically, as well as your likeness, should leave the university and the NCAA.”).
145 Id.
146 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 6–7.
147 See id. ¶¶ 331–36.
148 See Dan Wetzel, Making NCAA Pay?, YAHOO SPORTS (July 21, 2009, 4:22 P.M.),
http://sports.yahoo.com/news/making-ncaa-pay-202200316--ncaab.html (“It’s proof that the NCAA
has no right over former athletes.”).
149 See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 492.
150 See id. ¶¶ 496–97.
151 Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
152 McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338, 1344–45 (5th Cir. 1988).
153 See Banks v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 746 F. Supp. 850, 862 (N.D. Ind. 1990).
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4. Restraint is Not Reasonably Necessary to Achieve the Stated Objective
Third, the student-athletes argue the NCAA’s means are not reasonably
necessary to achieve its amateurism objective.154 While former student-athletes
make up the present plaintiff class, case law that has consistently ruled in the
NCAA’s favor addressed current student-athletes.155 While the Board of Regents
dicta clearly states that NCAA regulations are valid trade restraints furthering
amateurism, the plaintiffs argue that any regulation on former student-athletes does
not further the amateurism ideal.156 Accordingly, the plaintiffs contend that less
restrictive, alternative means are available that will allow for an amateurism ideal to
stand.157 Some of these alternatives include: group-licensing methods that share
revenues between student-athletes and their respective teams; trust funds for health
insurance; educational training; and student-athlete pension plans.158
The student-athletes have a strong argument that Form 08-3a is an illegal
contract that is unenforceable. Therefore, the NCAA is using illegal means to further
anti-competitive effects on the student-athletes.
Historically, the NCAA has
successfully combated this by arguing that its purpose is to promote amateurism.
However, student-athletes have a compelling argument that the NCAA no longer is
using reasonably necessary means to achieve this amateurism objective. Regardless,
student-athletes still argue that the NCAA is violating their publicity rights in
refusing to compensate them after their collegiate careers end.
B. Right of Publicity Analysis
The student-athletes claim that the NCAA unlawfully uses their images and
likenesses by refusing to compensate them, even after graduation. First, the studentathletes argue that they never consented to the uses of their likenesses, images,
names, or other distinctive appearances by EA.159 Accordingly, the plaintiffs argue
that EA, in conspiracy with the NCAA and CLC, has used their likenesses broadly,
and that they are suffering from that illegal usage. 160 In opposition, EA argues that
student-athlete likenesses are only a small part of the many “raw materials” that go

See Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 497.
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120 (upholding the notion of the NCAA as the defender of
amateurism in collegiate sports); Banks, 746 F. Supp. at 862–63 (denying a motion regarding
enforcement of the NCAA’s “no draft” rule when a player who entered the NFL draft, went
undrafted, and was denied a return to college football); McCormack, 845 F.2d at 1343–44 (holding
that restrictions on athlete compensation were not price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act).
156 Second Amended Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 169.
157 See id. ¶ 30 (stating “establishment of funds for health insurance, additional educational or
vocational training, and/or pension plans to benefit former student athletes.”).
158 See id.
159 See id. ¶¶ 452–55.
160 See id. ¶¶ 326–30.
154
155

[13:463 2014]

An Evolving NCAA Leading
To an Expanding Client List

481

into the creation of games.161 Supporting this position, EA points to precedent
protecting expressions in video games under the First Amendment. 162
But the plaintiffs have evidentiary ammunition to back their claim. Early
emails released in the discovery process addressed that the NCAA knew EA made
video games intended to match the characteristics of actual student-athletes.163
These emails exposed communications between NCAA and EA representatives,
which show that they had actual knowledge that everything but the student-athletes’
names were being utilized to create a more realistic effect in the video games. 164
While the NCAA claims any alleged use of a former or current athlete’s name, image,
or likeness could not be sanctioned by the NCAA because the NCAA does not have,
and does not claim to have, any rights to license such names or likenesses, the
evidence tends to show that the NCAA knowingly used student-athlete’s likenesses
for profit, which gives the student-athletes a strong right of publicity violation
argument.
That being said, two appellate courts held earlier this year that EA could not
invoke this First Amendment defense to the athletes’ right of publicity claims. 165 The
9th Circuit Court of Appeals decided 2-1 that EA was not protected by its free speech
argument.166 In determining this argument was not sufficient, the court noted the
First Amendment did not apply to EA’s use of Sam Keller’s image “because it literally
recreates Keller in the very setting in which he has achieved renown.”167
Accordingly, on September 26, 2013, EA Sports and CLC filed notice that they
reached a settlement over the use of the college athletes’ likenesses in its popular
NCAA video games.168 This settlement included claims brought by the plaintiffs in
the aforementioned lawsuit; however, it does not affect the plaintiffs’ claims against
the NCAA.169 More than 100,000 athletes will be eligible for compensation
161 Beth A. Cianfrone & Thomas A. Baker III, The Use of Student-Athlete Likeness in Sport
Video Games: An Application of the Right of Publicity, 20 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 35, 53 (2010)
(citing Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001)).
162 See id. at 55 (“To support its position, EA cites Romantics v. Activision (2008), E.S.S.
Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Video Games, Inc. (2006), and Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.,
(2006) as examples of cases where courts applied the First Amendment to protect expressions in
video games.”).
163 See Jon Solomon, NCAA Knew EA Sports Video Games Used Real Players, E-Mails From Ed
O’Bannon
Lawsuit
Show,
AL.COM
(Nov.
12,
2012,
8:28
P.M.),
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2012/11/ncaa_knew_ea_sports_video_game.html#
[hereinafter
Solomon, NCAA Knew]. The newest e-mails that have been released in discovery address that the
NCAA knew Electronic Arts Sports made video games that intended to match the characteristics of
actual college athletes. Id. The article addresses that in July, 2003 internal emails showed the
NCAA conceded to the knowing this, “[w]e don’t actually use player names but we do use all the
attributes and jersey numbers of the players.” Id.
164 Id.
165 Debra Cassens Weiss, First Amendment Doesn’t Protect Video Game Maker for Using
Athlete
Avatar,
9th
Circuit
Says,
ABA
J.
(Aug.
1,
2013,
7:17
A.M.),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/first_amendment_doesnt_protect_video_game_maker_for_u
sing_athlete_avatar_9t/.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Jon Solomon, EA Sports and CLC Settle Lawsuit by Ed O’Bannon Plaintiffs; NCAA
Remains
as
Lone
Defendant,
AL.COM
(Sept.
26,
2013,
9:51
A.M.),
http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/09/ea_will_not_make_college_footb.html.
169 Id.
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depending on their individual claim. 170 Additionally, EA announced it would no
longer produce its 2014 NCAA Football video game and may discontinue producing
the game indefinitely.171
In regards to the NCAA, the publicity rights claim is still alive because the
NCAA failed to prevent EA from using the players’ likenesses. 172 However, the
NCAA’s chief legal officer told USA Today Sports that the non-profit association is
prepared to go to the Supreme Court if necessary to defend lawsuits involving the use
of college athletes’ names, images, and likeness. 173
Due to the possible publicity and antitrust consequences of the student-athlete
complaint, the NCAA may need to reshape its current practices. This complaint
exemplifies the growing agitation over the NCAA’s procedures in obtaining studentathletes’ image rights without compensation. Accordingly, an evolved world of
amateur athletics may be on the horizon for former, current, and prospective
student-athletes.
IV. PROPOSAL
The NCAA and its constituent groups recognize that NCAA regulations have not
adapted at the same rate as evolving media technology.174 Accordingly, there has
been a lack of reform to account for the growing market usage of student-athletes’
names, images, and likenesses.175 Regardless of the current litigation’s outcome, the
NCAA needs to reform its practices and regulations to avoid this problem and
address the evolving times. In doing so, a Form 08-3a reformation is necessary to
ensure student-athletes have chances to negotiate their own publicity rights.
Accordingly, these student-athletes will need legal representation to assist in this
process, which will expand lawyers’ and sports agents’ possible client lists.
A. Resolving Issues with Former Student-Athletes
Based on the ongoing litigation, it is evident that a Form 08-3a reformation is
necessary to address the student-athletes’ perpetual publicity rights release. 176 The

Id.
Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See Kaburakis et al., supra note 96, at 15 (explaining “[o]ver the past five years, the NCAA’s
constituent groups have recognized that current NCAA amateur policies in Bylaw 12.5 do not
account for new media technology that has altered the way in which marketers utilize SAs’ names,
images, and likenesses”). The author then goes on to explain that the NCAA has been working on
this issue for a number of years, but it has been a very complex process. Id. at 16. Moreover, there
are a lot of stakeholders that would be greatly impacted by a substantial NCAA policy overhaul, so
they have been cautious to make quick decisions. Id.
175 See id. at 15.
176 See Solomon, NCAA Knew, supra note 163; Farrey, supra note 7 (“This whole area of name
and likeness and the NCAA is a disaster leading to catastrophe as far as I can tell.” Id.
170
171
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NCAA argues that student-athletes voluntarily release their publicity rights.177
Regardless, to avoid this issue in the future, the NCAA needs to make Form 08-3a
clearer to the contracting student-athletes. This would require Form 08-3a to
explicitly state that student-athletes are releasing their publicity rights to the NCAA
while in college and in perpetuity. Acknowledging this would arguably create a fair
bargain between student-athletes and the NCAA. However, student-athletes still
may feel like this is an unfair bargain. Mainly, the “elite athletes” who believe their
likenesses have a future market value will not be satisfied with this bargain.
Accordingly, a changing era for current student-athletes may be in the near future.
B. Effect on Current and Future Student-Athletes
If the NCAA were to establish a new set of regulations that fairly addressed
student-athletes’ likeness, current and future student-athletes would experience a
different collegiate experience. To create a fair bargain with student-athletes who
believe their likeness will have a future market value, the NCAA must allow these
student-athletes to negotiate the relinquishment of their publicity rights. Along with
allowing student-athletes to negotiate their own publicity rights, the NCAA would
also need to allow legal representation throughout this process.
Currently, student-athletes are prohibited from using representation throughout
their collegiate process.178 Revised NCAA regulations would allow student-athletes
the opportunity for representation throughout this process. It is unreasonable to
think that teenagers, graduating from high school, can negotiate the terms of their
likenesses without legal assistance.179 For most student-athletes, signing away their
likenesses will not be second-guessed. In fact, the value of many student-athletes’
likenesses would not even equal the total value of their athletic scholarship. 180 For
example, it was estimated the 2009–10 Stanford football team’s per-athlete average
likeness value was $36,463, which is less than the roughly $50,000 full athletic
scholarship they received.181

177 JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA: THE NCAA’S FIRST CENTURY 43, 55 (2006). The
author explains that the NCAA was established in 1910 as the country’s main “regulatory and
enforcement body for intercollegiate athletics.” Id. Over time, there were some issues that “seemed
to blur the amateur status of player and the role of students as athletes.” Id. at 42–43.
178 See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 3, § 12.3.1 (explaining that the NCAA manual prohibits the
use of agents not only as a student-athlete, but also as a prospective student-athlete).
179 See supra II.B.
180 See Mit Winter, A Deeper Look Into The Potential Damages In The O’Bannon Case, BUS. C.
SPORTS (Oct. 31, 2012), http://businessofcollegesports.com/2012/10/31/a-deeper-look-into-thepotential-damages-in-the-obannon-case. In explaining that many student-athletes likeness would
not equal that of their scholarship value, the author looks to the expert report submitted by Roger
Nolls. Id. Nolls submitted an expert report that examined the estimated value of student-athletes’
likenesses. Id. The author addressed the problem with many student-athletes whose likenesses do
not even cover their athletic scholarships. Id. According to Winter, “In many instances, a BCS
football player’s live broadcast damages would not even be equal to the value of his athletic
scholarship. For example, the per-athlete number for Stanford’s 2009–10 football team was $36,463.
The value of a full athletic scholarship at Stanford in 2009-10 was over $50,000.” Id.
181 Id.
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But the super-star, “Ed O’Bannon type,” elite athletes may recognize their
likeness has a great potential for future market value. Studies have found that these
super-star athletes’ likenesses can reach up to a quarter million dollars per athletic
year.182 Accordingly, those athletes may find it wise to preserve the opportunity to
collect on this likeness usage once their collegiate career ends.
This proposal would allow for a fair negotiation between the NCAA and the
respective student-athlete. It would also allow for more individualized likeness
recognition without affecting NCAA athletics uniformly. Superstar student-athletes
could negotiate for many different compensation methods. The National College
Players Association (“NCPA”) argues for an “Olympic model” that would allow
student-athletes to sign their own endorsement deals while in college. 183
Regardless of which method the NCAA chooses with each student-athlete, an
overarching “pay-for-play” compensation is not adequate. Adopting standards on an
individual basis would allow the NCAA to maintain its overall amateur status, while
compensating student-athletes who deserve revenue for their likenesses. This would
allow the NCAA to avoid the feared “pay-for-play” model. They feel that model would
undermine the amateur status of collegiate athletics 184 and create an even greater
negative impact on high school athletics. 185 Regardless, this proposal would allow
student-athletes the option to their own publicity right, or to forfeit it to the NCAA in
perpetuity.
The current litigation argues for a pure “pay-for-play” model; however, this
model has its downfalls. The NCAA would essentially forfeit its amateurism status
in a pay-for-play model. Collegiate athletics would fundamentally transform into a
182 See id. In contrast to the explanation that many student-athletes’ likenesses would not
equal that of their athletic scholarship, the author addresses the extreme situations where studentathletes’ likenesses are worth quite a bit. Id. The Nolls report found that in the 2009–10 season:
SEC football players’ share per school was $5,129,016; Pac-10 football players’ share per school was
$2,625,316; SEC basketball players’ share per school was between $3,490,636 and $3,597,328; and
Pac-10 basketball players’ share per school was between $2,744,750 and $3,551,969. Id.
183 See CROWLEY, supra note 177, at 42. Originally, Olympic athletes were forbidden to profit
from their success in the Olympics. Alexander Theroux, The Olympic Sham, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13,
1999, at A22. However, Olympic athletes are now permitted to make profit off advertisements,
television, and other marketing. See, e.g., Michael E. Ruane, Olympics Still Months Away, Swimmer
Brings Home Gold, WASH. POST, June 1, 2004, at A01 (detailing Michael Phelps’ advertisements).
See also Michael Rosenberg, Change is Long Overdue: College Football Players Should Be Paid,
SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED
(Aug.
26,
2010),
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/writers/
michael_rosenberg/08/26/pay.college/index.html (proposing that change is long overdue for NCAA’s
policy prohibiting college athletes to benefit from their success and the best model to do so is the
Olympic model).
184 See On the Mark, Quotes from President Emmert on Various NCAA Topics: Pay for Play,
NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/NCAA+President/NCAA+President
+Mark+Emmert (last visited Dec. 28, 2012) (“The stronger the link is between our athletics
programs and our academic programs—the more those athletics experiences are incorporated into
the academic experiences—then we don’t have to talk about athletics and academics as separate
entities but as part of the whole academic experience.”).
185 See Joe Nocera, Let’s Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 30, 2011,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-collegeathletes.html
?pagewanted=all. Some harmful effects to high school athletes that may result from a “pay-for-play”
model include: an emphasis on athletics over academics, more so than what currently exists; more
competitive high school athletics knowing that success in high school could result in a profitable
college future. Id.
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professional sport, where athletics come first and a college degree is an afterthought.
Instead, a model that would allow student-athletes the opportunity to negotiate their
own likenesses on individual bases would allow the NCAA to ensure amateurism’s
future and still create a fair bargain with student-athletes.
Based on this proposal, an emerging class of legal representation may be in the
near future. Athletic agents and lawyers, such as Sonny Vacarro, 186 who once
targeted professional athletes, will now be expanding their clientele to potential
superstar high school athletes. On October 2, 2013, nationally renowned law firm
Winston & Strawn LLP announced the launch of the firm’s college sports practice
group.187
According to the press release, the practice group will provide
“comprehensive legal services to clients involved in all aspects of college and amateur
athletics, including the representation of colleges and universities involved in NCAA
enforcement investigations and violations of NCAA legislation.”188
Just as the current litigants argue, high school athletes who sign Form 08-3a are
not in positions to realize the implications that accompany signing a letter of intent
with a collegiate university.189 Moreover, student-athletes may not comprehend their
publicity right value. Providing legal representation, such as Winston & Strawn’s
sports practice group, would ensure student-athletes are fully aware of the legal
relationship they are entering into with the NCAA.
Allowing student-athletes legal representation throughout this process will
create a fair bargaining agreement between the NCAA and student-athlete. A cut of
this incredible likeness revenue that historically has gone into the NCAA’s “pocket”
may eventually be spread to the respective student-athletes and their legal
representation. This proposal would prevent future litigation addressing studentathletes’ publicity rights while in college and in perpetuity.
V. CONCLUSION
The NCAA historically has relied on the participation of student-athletes to
return “eye-opening” annual profits. The NCAA’s arbitrary rules and regulations
allow it to continually return a profit without acknowledging the unfair
compensation to student-athletes. What once was considered an institution that
promoted amateurism is now seen as a billion-dollar industry that deprives studentathletes an opportunity to profit on their own likeness. These student-athletes
deserve the chance to profit off their own abilities.

186 See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation, Joint Case
Management Conference Statement, 2012 WL 2849057, at 5.D.1. (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2012). In this
conference the NCAA served Sonny Vaccaro with a subpoena for specific documents. Id. Vacarro is
known as a prominent “runner” who procured “several of the name plaintiffs to join in these suits.”
Id. Vacarro is seen as a very popular negotiator and agent for “big time” athletes. Id.
187 Winston & Strawn Launches College Sports Practice Group, WINSTON & STRAWN, (Oct. 2,
2013)
http://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/winston-strawn-launches-college-sportspractice-group.html.
188 Id.
189 See supra Part II.B.
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But to avoid turning the NCAA “on its head,”190 a new set of regulations that
give student-athletes a fair chance is essential. In turn, a fair NCAA with a new set
of regulations is likely to open up a whole new class of legal representation for
athletic agents and lawyers negotiating on student-athlete’s behalf.

190 See Winter, supra note 180. The author addresses some of the main problems that would
accompany paying student-athletes; mainly, a shock to college athletics. For example, Division I
members will lose a great portion of their athletics budgets. Id. As a result, all the money
distributed to Division I schools will be lost. Id. Accordingly, the schools that do not turn over a
profit, and are dependent upon other schools in their conference to return profit, will struggle to
maintain their sporting programs. Id.

